|About the Book|
PRAISE FOR THE BOOK: Dejno ka challenges the reader to open his mind for a new interpretation of Russells work, in particular that relevance notions have a greater place in his philosophy of logic than has been stressed before. Dejno kas work isMorePRAISE FOR THE BOOK: Dejno ka challenges the reader to open his mind for a new interpretation of Russells work, in particular that relevance notions have a greater place in his philosophy of logic than has been stressed before. Dejno kas work is full of material which stimulates one to rethink Russells philosophy of logic, and it is greatly to the authors credit that he brings to light such a wealth of crucial issues in the history and philosophy of logic. - Shahid Rahman. Professor Rahman teaches at the Universite de Lille (France). He has served as dean and supervised many dissertations. He is the author of several books and the editor of several anthologies in logic and the philosophy of logic. He recently edited a book on Hugh MacColl. He has also written many articles and reviews, and read papers at various congresses. BOOK DESCRIPTION: In the first volume of their monumental work, Entailment, Alan Ross Anderson and Nuel D. Belnap say that the modern classical tradition[, ] stemming from Frege and Whitehead-Russell, gave no consideration whatsoever to the classical notion of relevance. But just what is this classical notion? I argue that the relevance tradition is implicitly most deeply concerned with the containment of truth-grounds. Thus modern classical logicians such as Peirce, Frege, Russell, Wittgenstein, and Quine are implicit relevantists on the deepest level. In showing this, I reunite two fields of logic which have become basically separated from each other: relevance logic and diagram logic. I argue that there are two main concepts of relevance, intensional and extensional. The first is that of the relevantists. The second is the concept of truth-ground containment as following from in Wittgensteins Tractatus. I show that this second concept belongs to the diagram tradition of showing that the premisses contain the conclusion by the fact that the conclusion is diagrammed in the very act of diagramming the premisses. I argue that the extensional concept is primary, with at least five usable modern classical filters or constraints, and indefinitely many secondary intensional filters or constraints. In this way, I argue for a major reunion of purpose in logic between relevantists and modern classical logicians. This book is based on my paper of the same name in Logica Universalis, vol. 4/1, pp. 67-135, 2010. Material from the paper appears by kind permission of Springer, and has been improved and expanded.